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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

PHILLIP EDWARD MILLER,
Petitioner/Appellant/
Cross-Appellee,
v.

APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF

G. BARTON BLACKSTOCK, Bureau
Chief, Driver License Services, State of
Utah,
Case No. 20010306-CA
(Lower Docket 000902138)

Respondent/Appellee/
Cross-Appellant.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah code
Ann. Section 78-2a-3(b)(i), 1953, as amended. In this Appeal the Appellant
challenges the legality of the district court's ruling finding a violation of his due
process and statutory rights but fashioning a remedy which only reduced the
suspension of his driver's license by sixty days. A copy of the order and the
transcripts of the proceeding are attached hereto as Addendums A and B.
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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Issue:

Did the District Court err in ruling that where there has been notice and a

hearing, but prior to the hearing there has been an unlawful deprivation of an
important interest, whether such a violation of due process rights is fatal to the
revocation.

Standard of Review:

The standard of review is the "correction of error"

standard. See Brinkerhoff v. Schwendiman. 790 P.2d 587, 589 (Ut. App. 1990).
In addition, the issue concerns statutory interpretation, requiring application of the
correctness standard. State v. Arviso. 993 P.2d 894 (Ut. App. 1999).

PRESERVATION OF THE ARGUMENT
The Appellant was represented by counsel at the trial de novo hearing held
on December 21, 2000. During the hearing the argument was centered around the
issue in this case. At the conclusion of the hearing the judge entered an order
ruling in the defendant's favor, finding that the defendant's due process and
statutory rights had been violated, and fashioning his own remedy of a sixty day
reduction in the suspension period. See Addendum A at 5. After orally ruling
from the bench, counsel for the Appellant specifically preserved his argument by
objection to the Court's ruling. See Addendum B at 29-30.
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RULES, STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
The following statute and constitutional provision will be determinative of
the issue on appeal:
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.10(2)
(2)(a) If the person has been placed under arrest, has then been requested by
a peace officer to submit to any one or more of the chemical tests under Subsection
(1), and refuses to submit to any chemical test requested, the person shall be
warned by the peace officer requesting the test or tests that a refusal to submit to
the test or tests can result in revocation of the person's license to operate a motor
vehicle.
(b) Following the warning under Subsection (2)(a), if the person does not
immediately request that the chemical test or tests as offered by a peace officer be
administered a peace officer shall serve on the person, on behalf of the Driver
License Division, immediate notice of the Driver License Division's intention to
revoke the person's privilege or license to operate a motor vehicle. When the
officer served the immediate notice on behalf of the Driver License Division, he
shall:
(i) take the Utah license certificate or permit, if any, of the operator;
(ii) issue a temporary license effective for only 29 days; and
(hi) supply to the operator, on a form approved by the Driver License
Division, basic information regarding how to obtain a hearing before
the Driver License Division. . .
United States Constitution Amendment 14
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they
reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges
or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On January 21, 2000, the Appellant was arrested for Driving Under the
Influence of Alcohol. At the time of his arrest, the police officer took the
appellant's driver's license for refusing to submit to a breath test. Instead of
issuing the appellant a temporary driver's license, the officer deprived the appellant
of this important right without a hearing in violation of his Due Process and
statutory rights. On December 21, 2000, after a hearing in the Driver's License
Division, the Appellant had a trial de novo before the District Court. See
Addendum B, Transcripts of Hearing. At that hearing argument was heard and the
judge determined that the defendant's rights had been violated by the officer's
actions. Addendum A at 5. The Court fashioned its own remedy and reduced the
appellant's suspension period by only sixty days. Addendum A at 5.
A final written order was entered and signed by the Court on February 22,
2001. Addendum A. A notice of Appeal was filed on March 9, 2001. The
Respondent filed a notice of cross-appeal on March 26, 2001.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The Appellant was arrested for Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol on
January 21, 2000, by Officer K. Olsen of the West Valley City Police Department.
The officer, acting in behalf of the Respondent, seized the Appellant's driver's
license and served the Appellant with a form approved by the Respondent, that
notified the Appellant of his right to request a hearing for his driving privilege
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within ten (10) days. Addendum A at 2. The form has boxes at the bottom where
the officer, acting as an agent of the Respondent, can indicate with a mark that the
form is either "VALID" or "NOT VALID" as a driver's license for up to thirty
days. Addendum A at 2-3. The officer marked that the form was "NOT VALID"
as a temporary license for the reason that the Appellant refused to take a breath test
requested by the officer. Addendum A at 3. The trial court concluded that the
action by the officer violated Section 41-6-44.10(2)(b)(ii) 1953 as amended and
also violated the Appellant's due process rights and fashioned a remedy reducing
the suspension period by sixty days. Addendum A at 5.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The lower court correctly ruled that the officer's actions violated the statute
and the defendant's due process rights when the officer deprived the appellant of
his driver license privilege without a hearing. The lower court incorrectly ruled
that the violation was not fatal to the revocation process and instead fashioned a
remedy reducing the suspension period by sixty days.
The ruling of the District Court that the violation of the Appellant's rights
was not fatal to the revocation process has at least two ramifications. First, there
would be little deterrent effect to the officers if the driver's license could be
suspended even after their improper conduct. Second, the remedy would be
limited to only those who could afford an attorney in the civil matter and who
could afford to pursue a trial de novo in the District Court.
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ARGUMENT
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO FIND
THAT THE DUE PROCESS VIOLATION BY THE POLICE
OFFICER WAS FATAL TO THE DRIVER'S LICENSE
REVOCATION PROCESS.
Discussion
The United States Supreme court and the Utah appellate courts have
recognized that a defendant has certain due process rights in connection with the
right to possess a driver's license. In Bell v. Burson. 402 U.S. 535 (1971), the
United States Supreme Court stated that "[o]nce licenses are issued, as in
petitioner's case, their continued possession may become essential in the pursuit of
a livelihood. Suspension of issued licenses thus involves state action that
adjudicates important interests of the licensees. In such cases the licenses are not
to be taken away without that procedural Due Process required by the Fourteenth
Amendment." Id- at 539; see also Amendment 14 United States Constitution. The
Court went on to state that "[t]his is but an application of the general proposition
that relevant constitutional restraints limit state power to terminate an entitlement
whether the entitlement is denominated a 'right' or a 'privilege.'" Id- (citing
Sherbert v. Verner. 374 U.S. 398 (1963)).
In Ballard v. State. Motor Vehicle Div.. Licensing Dep't.. 595 P.2d 1302,
1304 (Utah 1979), the Utah Supreme Court held that "the right to drive is a

6

valuable right or privilege and it cannot be taken away without procedural due
process." More recently, the Utah Supreme Court also stated that "[a]t a minimum,
timely and adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard in a meaningful way are
at the very heart of procedural fairness." In re Worthen. 926 P.2d 853, 876 (Utah
1996).
The driver's license statute at issue in this case recognizes these safeguards
and provides for notice in the statute. See Utah code Ann. § 41-6-44.10(2). The
statute itself does not explicitly state a remedy for a violation of the due process
rights it protects. The Appellant believes that instead of the sixty day reduction in
the suspension period ordered by the District Court, the remedy should have been a
finding that the violation of the statute was fatal to the revocation process.
The facts of this case are that the officer did not issue the Appellant a
temporary license and instead revoked the Appellant's license without any due
process at all. In this case the language of the statute is mandatory using the word
"shall" when it comes to issuing a temporary license. Utah Code Ann. 41-644.10(2)(b)(ii). In interpreting the very same statute this Court has stated that the
term "'shall' is usually presumed mandatory and has been interpreted as such in
this and other jurisdictions." Moore v. Schwendiman, 750 P.2d 204, 207 (Ut. App.
1988). The mandatory language makes a violation of the "shall" requirement a
violation of the statute.
The violation of the statute is fatal to the revocation process. In a recent case
this Court affirmed a lower court holding finding a violation of this very same

7

statute to be fatal to the revocation process. In Mabus v. Blackstock, 994 P.2d
1272 (Ut. App. 1999), the issue was the failure of the police officer to inform the
petitioner of the officer's intent to revoke the petitioner's driver's license and the
manner in which the petitioner could obtain a hearing as required in the same
statute at issue here only instead of subsection 2(b)(ii) being at issue it was
subsection 2(b)(iii). Id.; see also Utah Code Ann. 41-6-44.10(2)(b).
In Mabus, the Court held that the "failure rendered the administrative
revocation of appellant's license and the derivative district court review void and
the revocation a legal nullity." 994 P.2d at 1275. In comparing the holding in
Mabus, to this case the remedy should be the same. The deprivation of the
petitioner's right and privilege to drive without first providing the right to have a
hearing violates the statute and any subsequent revocation is a legal nullity. In
Moore v. Schwendiman, the Court held that a violation of this same statute at issue
in this case, by failing to file a police report within five days of arrest, resulted in a
finding that the revocation of the driver's license that followed was a legal nullity
and the district court review of the revocation was void. 750 P.2d at 207.
The officer in this case, acting as an agent of the Driver's License Division,
violated the appellant's statutory rights. Although the statute does not expressly
state a remedy, this Court's prior cases support a finding that the subsequent
revocation was a legal nullity as the appropriate remedy. See Mabus v.
Blackstock, 994 P.2d 1272; Moore v. Schwendiman; 750 P.2d 204.
There are many reasons for finding that the violation of the statutory
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Benjamin A. Hamilton
Attorney for Appellant
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RTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I Benjamin A. FLiiii;,*,.., hereby certify that I have caused to be hand
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i

copies of the foregoing to me Utah Court of
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A;, v, oils Building. 160 East 300 South, o ' Floui, P.U. Bo\ i4'jN54, this
day of June _0;

<

; ^ * ^ ^ ^

Benjamin A. Hamilton
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ADDENDUM A
IHSIK^TPOTRTOKhl U

Benjamin A. Hamilton (#6238)
Attorney for Defendant
356 East 900 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801)322-3622
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MAIFOFITAH

PHILLIP EDWARD MILLER,
FINDINGS UF FAG I1,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
AND ORDER

vs.
G. BARTON BLACKSTOCK,
Director, Utah State IVKer
License Division,
Respondent.

Case No. 000902138
Judge RONALD E. NEHRING

The above-entitled matter came before the court for a • :ai ov //MW< on Decembc; 2",

• i mi.

• ] appeared and the Respondent appealed thiwugh counsel Reoeeca I) Waidiosi, ASMstant

Attcrnev General

• :\\ -

Prior to the Man v! tru 'hearing, the Prt!tu<rei agreed and stipulator that the

lie Ann ^ 4 ;-o-4-F anci the reading o: the chemical test admomoons to the Pemionei anc

the establishing of the knowing refusal were and are met. Fhe 'Petitioner only challenges the
confiscatioi \ of his di ivei ":'s license and pi ivilege by the Respondei it, through the arresting officer
pi ior to affording the Petitioner with a, hearing.

presented a: me hearing, being fully advised in the premises, makes the following Findings of Fact

and Conclusions of Law and Order.

FINDING OF FACTS
1.

On January 21, 2000, the Petitioner, PHILLIP EDWARD MILLER, (hereinafter the
"Petitioner") was arrested for Driving Under the Influence in violation of Utah Code Ann.
§ 41-6-44, by Officer K. Olsen of the West Valley City Police Department..

2.

After the arrest, the Petitioner was transported to the West Valley City Police Department
and was read the chemical test admonitions verbatim from the DUI Report Form. The
Petitioner was requested to submit to a chemical test to measure the alcohol content of his
breath. Officer Olsen, acting in behalf of the Respondent, read The Petitioner the refusal
admonition and the Petitioner refused to submit to the chemical test.

3.

The arresting officer seized the Petitioner's driver's license and, acting as an agent of the
Respondent, personally served the Petitioner a form,1 approved by the Respondent, that
notified the Petitioner of his right to a hearing for his driving privileges if requested within
ten (10) days of his arrest.

4.

Pursuant to the notice, the Petitioner requested a hearing with the Driver License Division
and the hearing was held on February 15, 2000. As a result of the hearing, the Petitioner's
driving privileges were revoked for one (1) year for his refusal to submit to a chemical test
after an arrest for Driving Under the Influence.

5.

The above mentioned form (Exhibit 1) has boxes at the bottom where the officer, acting
as an agent of the respondent can mark a box indicating that the form is either "VALID"
or "NOT VALID" as a driver's license for up to thirty (30) days.
1

Petitioner's Exhibit 1.
2

6.

A f t e r confi>jaiiiiu ,.,.

f

^'..w.
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. . . shall sei ve on the person, on behalf of the Driver I icense Division, immediate notice
of the Driver License Divisions intention to revoke the p e r s o n ' s privilege or license to
operate a motor vehicle. When the officer serves the immediate notice on behalf of the
Driver License Division, he shall:
(i) take the Utah license certificate or pen nit, if any, of the operator;
(ii) issue a temporary license effective for only 29 days\ and
I in) supply to the operator, on a form approved by the Drivei Licc:;:^ J I M ; . ^ , , . ,;sic
information reuardinu how to obtain a hearinu before the D r i \ e r 1 icense Division.

i r e oificei. a^iing ou benali ;>: the Resa-ndent \w .his ^asc, seized the Petitionee's license
and failed to i w i e a ^^n^poian license to *•
license
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i
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4 it t o a
I he Petitioner

e x e r c i s e d t: I i a, t i i g t 11:, 1 1 i e h e a, i 11 i s > v ' a, s h e I, d a, i i cl 11 i e R, e s p o n cl e 111: i e v o k: e cl l: 1 i e P e t: i t: i o 11 e r' s cl i i v i i i, g
pr ivilege for one year,, 1 1 ic ir itegi ity of the lieai mg was not: compromised by the unlawfi ,il,
suspension of the Petitioner's driving privilege between the arrest of the Petitioner and the
1 i c a i ii ii »;,

I his court concludes that the i lature of the problem presented here is not, a, systemic
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problem in law enforcement but is rather a problem of an isolated nature and one occurring only
from time to time infrequently

Therefore, it is this court's responsibility to fashion an

appropriate remedy for the violations to the Petitioner's statutory and due process rigths The
court has considerable discretion in fashioning a remedy to this type of due process violation The
Petitioner argues that the United States Supreme Court, in Bell v Burson, 402 U S 535, 91 S Ct
1586 (1971), held that due process requires notice and a hearing before there can be a deprivation
of the interest here involved
The precise question presented in this case is - where there has been notice and a hearing,
but prior to the hearing there has been an unlawful deprivation of an important interest - does the
unlawful deprivation of one's driving interest restrict the Driver License Division from taking any
further authority to effect a deprivation9 Or rather, is the Respondent in this case precluded from
revoking the Petitioner's license based on the previous violation of the Petitioner's statutory and
due process rights9 The answer is no. The Respondent may properly proceed with the process
which might result in the further deprivation of the Petitioner's rights The Respondent's actions,
however, are subject to the fashioning of a remedy by the District Court
The court hereby concludes that the revocation of the Petitioner's driving privilege was
appropriate The court also finds that, given the facts and circumstances of this case, the
Petitioner's driving privilege should be reinstated by the Respondent Sixty (60) days prior to the
One (1) year revocation previously ordered by the Respondent
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ORDER
Based on the foregoing,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the revocation of the Petitioner's driving privilege be
upheld with the modification that the revocation be for a period of One (1) year, less Sixty (60)
days to remedy the Petitioner for the violation which occurred to his statutory and due process
rights
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the revocation be stayed pending an appeal to the Utah
Court of Appeals of this Order
Dated this Z£* , day of February, 2001

Approvers to form

REBECCA D WALDRON
Attorney for Respondent
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that on the ^Wv

day of February, 2000, a true and correct cops of the

foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order was mailed to the following

Rebecca VValdron
Assistant Attorney General
P O Box 140857
160 East 300 South
Salt Lake Citv, Utah 84114-1857
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DUI
SUMMONS AND CITATION

JSUING
ENFORCEMENT
AGENCY

STATE OF UTAH
JNTY OF
>-•

NAME

CASE
NO.
(Last)

CITATION NO.

D318373

(First)

(Middle)

(City)

ADDRESS

DOB

Zip

(State)

J

VOF

Driver License No.

-IE DEFENDANT IS HEREBY
/EN NOTICE TO APPEAR IN:

'7

7

Height

Restriction

Social Security No.
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Year

Vehicle Type

Sex
Color

State

Vehicle License
No
:ense is
Accident

C o m m . Vehicle Haz. Material

)F.

;

) AT.

THE ABOVE NAMED DEFENDANT IS CHARGED WITH VIOLATING:
• UTAH CODE D COUNTY CODE • CITY CODE NO.:
-

"7^^

C Yes 3 No

. DAY OF

ON THE

lan (5) nor more than (14) d a / s i f t e r , issuance^
tion.

Motorcycle
D Yet

Weight

Vehicle M a k e -

State

Expires

Class

G Yes

D No

. 19.

LOCATIQN':

D Yes

CfNo

Expires

Direction of Travel
N

D No

S E W

MILITARY TIME .
. MILE POST NO.

VIOLATION(S):

PLAINTIFF'S
EXHIBIT

W I T H O U T A D M I T T I N G GUILT I PROMISE T O A P P E A R AS D I R E C T E D H E R E I N

U-*m *- ..V** V

A<m C. ^ v * * ' V ' '**» *+•*

_1

SIGNATURE

^ UuTr u^ i ^ J I n r u r r c i \ U A l \ i I
I C E R T I F Y T H A T A COPY OF THIS S U M M O N S A N D C I T A T I O N W A S DULY S E R V C U
A C C O R D I N G TO LAW ON THE A B O V E DATE A N D I K N O W OR BELIEVE A N D SO A L L E G E T H A T THE ABOVE
N A M E D D E F E N D A N T DID COMMIT THE O F F E N S E H E R E I N SET F O R T H C O N T R A R Y TO LAW. I FURTHER
C E R T I F Y T H A T THE C O U R T TO W H I C H T H E D E F E N D A N T H A S B E E N D I R E C T E D T O A P P E A R IS T H E PROPER
C O U R T P U R S U A N T T O SECTION 77-7-19, U.C.A.
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OFFICER.

B A D G E NO.
D A T E O F CITATION

COMPLAINANT.

D A T E S E N T T O DLD

D O C K E T NO.

DEFENDANT COPY

READ CAREFULLY
on is not an information a n d will not be u s e d as a n i n f o r m a t i o n without your consent. If an information is filed y o u will b e p r o v i d e d a copy by the court.
T appear in court on or before the t i m e set in this citation. IF Y O U FAIL T O A P P E A R A N I N F O R M A T I O N W I L L B E F I L E D A N D T H E C O U R T M A Y ISSUE A
T FOR Y O U R A R R E S T .

NOTICE OF INTENT TO DENY, SUSPEND, REVOKE, OR DISQUALIFY
H E R E B Y N O T I F I E D T H A T T H I R T Y (30) D A Y S F R O M T H E D A T E O F T H I S N O T I C E Y O U R D R I V I N G P R I V I L E G E IN T H E S T A T E O F U T A H W I L L B E :
( A R R E S T U N D E R 41-6-44 OR 41-6-44.6 U C A )

suspended

pursuant to 53-3-223 UCA lor ninety (90) d a y s for a first offense or for one (1) year for subsequent

offenses. In addition, c o m m e r c i a l drivers in c o m m e r c i a l vehicles, your commercial privilege will be disqualified

for one (1) year for a first offense and a

m i n i m u m of ten (10) years for a s u b s e q u e n t offense.
A R R E S T U N D E R 32A-12-209 UCA - U N D E R 21 Y E A R S O F AGE)

denied

pursuant to

one (1) year for a subsequent offense within three (3) years, or denied

53-3-231 U C A for ninety (90) d a y s for a first offense, or suspended

for

for one (1) year or until age s e v e n t e e n (17), w h i c h e v e r is longer, if you have not

been issued an original operator license. C O M P L E T I O N O F A U T H O R I Z E D S U B S T A N C E A B U S E P R O G R A M R E Q U I R E D FOR R E I N S T A T E M E N T .

REFUSAL TO SUBMIT UNDER 41-6-44.10 UCA)

revoked

for one (1) year for a first refusal to submit to a c h e m i c a l test or for eighteen (18) months if it is a

second or subsequent license withdrawal for an alcohol or drug related driving offense.
COMMERCIAL DISQUALIFICATION 53-3-418 UCA)

disqualified,

for driving a commercial vehicle, pursuant to 53-3-414 U C A for one (1) year for a first offense

ind a m i n i m u m of ten (10) years for s u b s e q u e n t o f f e n s e . If you refuse the chemical test the s a m e sanctions apply.

HEARING:

This Division will grant you opportunity for a hearing only if you submit a W R I T T E N R E Q U E S T within T E N (10) D A Y S of your arrest to Driver License

) Box 30560, Salt Lake City, Utah 8 4 1 3 0 - 0 5 6 0 ( A T T N : DUI Section). U p o n your timely request you will be notified of the time a n d place of the hearing. The hearing
s purpose of granting a limited license but only to d e t e r m i n e if your driving privilege is to be d e n i e d , s u s p e n d e d , r e v o k e d or disqualified. The administrative hearing
iture and does not satisfy the requirement for y o u to appear in court w h e n required. F A I L U R E T O R E Q U E S T A H E A R I N G O R F A I L U R E T O A P P E A R FOR A
nay result in your driving privilege being d e n i e d , s u s p e n d e d , revoked or disqualified.

•

NOT VALID

Q

as a t e m p o r a r y license for up to thirty (30) days from the date of this notice
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P R O C E E D I N G S

THE COURT:

L e t ' s s e e , did I take t h a t f i l e or did

you?
(Inaudible)
THE COURT:

Let's turn to Miller versus Blackstock,

000902138.
Counsel, would you please state your appearances?
MS. WALDRON:

Rebecca Waldron for the respondent.

MR. HAMILTON:

Ben Hamilton for the petitioner,

your Honor.
THE COURT:

It looks like Mr. Hamilton just handed

Ms. Waldron the same case that Mr. Hamilton just gave to me
and I —
MR. HAMILTON:

What I just handed her was, she

asked to see a copy of the code.
THE COURT:

Uh huh.

MS. WALDRON:

I haven't r e a d —

But he previously just handed me a

copy of the same case he just handed you.
THE COURT:

That I haven't read.

MR. HAMILTON:
before we begin this?

Would you like to take a recess
We've narrowed the issues

significantly and instead of looking at probable cause and
having to put on the witness to establish that the officer
had sufficient probable cause to make the arrest and perform
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the field sobriety tests, we're foregoing that and focusing
instead on just the one issue.
And if the Court would like to hear the issue and
then take a recess to read that case, (inaudible)
THE COURT:

I'm going to accept that invitation.

Yeah, I'd like to have you kinda give me some context of the
case, then I'll read it and then I may come back and pick it
up again.
MR. HAMILTON:
THE COURT:

Sure.

Are you comfortable with this, Ms.

Waldron?
MS. WALDRON:
talked—okay.

Yeah, I am.

My—I'm fine.

We had

We had talked about it and this is continuing,

we had talked about it, you know, about three months ago
(inaudible) but the issue is, is usually on these notices,
the officer will check the license—that piece of paper is
valid for a period of 30 days until the hearing.

It didn't

happen in this case and the issue is, is that (inaudible) the
Driver's License ability to suspend or revoke the license.
And I'm right now looking at 41-4-6-44.10. I
wonder—you wouldn't happen to have the 53-3 Section, would
you?
THE COURT:

What section should I be looking at?

MR. HAMILTON:

The relevant section here, your

Honor, is—Mr. Miller's driver's license was suspended under

3

41-6-44.10.

And—

MS. WALDRON:
sections.

There's two—there's two code

That one, and then the 53-3-223.
MR. HAMILTON:

And the Title 53 section deals with

suspension of driver's licenses on what's called per se
suspension, based on the probable cause to have arrested the
individual in the first place for DUI.
MS. WALDRON:

And—

There should be a similar one under

the refusal.
MR. HAMILTON:

And Title 41, the section under

Title 41 deals with whether the individual refused to blow in
the machine and the suspension based on that and that's the
issue before the Court today because that's what Mr. Miller's
license was suspended on.
If you'll notice, in the citation—
THE COURT:

Well, let me make sure I understand.

So, your contention is that Title 53 isn't relevant 'cause
we're not fighting the battle over probable cause?
MR. HAMILTON:

Right.

But it's virtually identical

in terms of what the officer's duties are.
THE COURT:

All right.

MR. HAMILTON:

So, it really doesn't matter which

one we go off because the language is identical, but I think
we should be focusing on the proper section—
THE COURT:

Which is the 41-6-44.
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1

MR. HAMILTON:

2

THE COURT:

3

MR. HAMILTON:

44.10, that's right.

44.10.
And—and last—and we—and the

4

petitioner would move at this point to have admitted as

5

evidence Petitioner's Exhibit 1, which is a copy of the

6

citation and form published by the Driver's License Division

7

that is required to be handed to my client and served before

8

any suspension can be done.

9

And you'll notice that the—

10

THE COURT:

Well, just a second.

11

Ms. Waldron—

12

MS. WALDRON: Yes.

13

THE COURT:

14

MS. WALDRON:

15

THE COURT:

16

MR. HAMILTON:

—any objection to Exhibit 1?
No objection, your Honor.

Exhibit l's received.
You'll notice at the bottom of that

17

form, it gives the officer the opportunity to check one of

18

two boxes, one box saying, this is valid and the other

19

saying, not valid; has a temporary license for up to 30 days

20

from the date of this notice.

21

THE COURT:

22

MR. HAMILTON:

Uh huh.
The officer checked that this is not

23

a valid license and I think we can stipulate that the officer

24

confiscated the Utah license from Mr. Miller; is that fair to

25

say?

MR. MILLER:

Yes.

MR. HAMILTON:

So, I believe we have a stipulation

from the Driver's License Division at this point, that Mr.
Miller's license was taken, his physical license, the
certificate.

He was issued instead this driver—this

citation, which is also—should be a permit, assuming he had
a valid driver's license and that, we would also ask for a
stipulation.
THE COURT:

All right.

So, let me make sure I

understand, Mr. Hamilton.
The valid/not valid option is present to cover
those circumstances in which the person cited does not have a
valid operator's license at the time of the arrest?
MR. HAMILTON:
THE COURT:

That's correct.

So that there isn't a de facto grant of

a — o f a temporary license to someone who didn't have one in
the first place; is t h a t —
MR. HAMILTON:

Yes.

So, the officer, o n — a c t i n g —

acting on behalf of the Driver's License Division isn't
taking authority that he doesn't h a v e —
THE COURT:

That he doesn't have.

MR. HAMILTON:

— t o give somebody a license when

they don't have one in the first place.
THE COURT:

So, the arresting officer makes an

initial determination as to the validity of the driver's

6

license status and based on that determination, checks one
box or the other; is that correct?
MR. HAMILTON:

That's correct.

THE COURT: Okay.
MR. HAMILTON:

And that was in fact done here, but

instead of checking that this is a valid license, temporary
license, the officer checked that this is not a valid
temporary license for up to 30 days.
The statute—the reason for the 30-day limitation
is because the statute, in meeting due process grounds, has
set forth that the hearing must occur on whether they're
going to revoke or suspend this individual's license within
the 30-day period.
THE COURT:

Uh huh.

MR. HAMILTON:

And so—so we're not taking away the

individual's driving privileges without affording him the due
process of having notice and right to a hearing—
THE COURT:

Uh huh.

MR. HAMILTON:

—it's required that the person be

granted this temporary driving privilege.
THE COURT:

Got it.

MR. HAMILTON:

The—the officer checked for his

reason for not issuing a temporary license, at the bottom of
the citation, was the refusal of the test.
In the refusal statute, which is the 41-6-44.10
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statute, under Subsection (2)(b)—these are the requirements
that the officer is supposed to meet.

Following one, under

Subsection (a), if the person does not immediately request
that the chemical test or tests as offered by a peace officer
be administered, a peace officer shall serve on the person on
behalf of the Driver's License Division immediate notice of
the Driver's License Division's intention to revoke the
person's privilege or license to operate a motor vehicle.
Now, that was done.

On behalf of the Driver's

License Division, the officer submitted to Mr. Miller this
citation, which is the notice approved of by the Driver's
License Division and at the bottom, where it—in bold type,
in small type but in bold type, it affords Mr. Miller the
notice of his right to a hearing.
THE COURT:

Uh huh.

MR. HAMILTON:

So that was complied with.

When the officer serves the immediate notice on
behalf of the Driver's License Division, he shall do the
following:
(1)

Take the Utah license, certificate or permit,

if any, of the operator—which was done;
(2)

Issue a temporary license effective for only

29 days, which was not done and that's our contention; and
(3)

Supply the operator on a form approved by the

Driver's License Division basic information regarding how to
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request a hearing, which was done; and a citation issued by
peace officer may, if approved as to form by the Driver's
License Division, serve as a temporary license and that is
what was provided.

This form, which the Court has before it

as Petitioner's Exhibit 1, is the form approved and the
officer violated 41-6-41.10, Subsection (2)(b)(ii).
THE COURT:

Okay.

Now, I'm going to ask you what

you are going to anticipate from me as the obvious question.
I assume that I entered a stay here?
MR. HAMILTON:
THE COURT:

You did.

Okay.

And so Mr. Miller's driving

privileges have been intact to today?
MR. HAMILTON:
THE COURT:

That's not correct.

That's not correct?

MR. HAMILTON: No.
MS. WALDRON:
MR. HAMILTON:
MS. WALDRON:

I think he h a s —
(Inaudible) i s —
I — I — I was counting it up.

He was

arrested on January 22nd, something like that, and the stay
was granted on March something; so if it was suspended, i t —
if you count t h e —
MR. HAMILTON:

(Inaudible) arrest until we got it

through the Driver's License hearing which was—ruled against
him—
THE COURT: Yeah.
9

MR. HAMILTON:

So, he didn't have a license from

the time he got arrested through the hearing at the Driver's
License Division, which he was supposed to have through that
time period and then when they took action to take away his
license and revoked his driving privileges for a year, we
appealed it.

It continued to be lost until the State, or the

Driver's License Division requested a continuance—
THE COURT:

Okay.

MS. WALDRON:

Well, actually, I think—

MR. HAMILTON:
MS. WALDRON:
THE COURT:

I'm looking at the file.

Well, but the—

MS. WALDRON:
THE COURT:

— a t that time—

The stay was signed on March 2 2nd.

Why don't we—why isn't all this moot

except for whatever deprivation of Mr. Miller's rights might
be proven occurred during that interval of time between the
arrest and the administrative hearing?
MS. WALDRON:

See, that's our argument is that

whatever, you know, they had the—the hearing was basically a
post-deprivation hearing and it was determined at that point
that there was enough—that it made—met the requirements to
suspend or revoke his license for a year—
THE COURT:

Well, Ms. Waldron, what I want to hear

from is—actually, that question was directed to Mr. Hamilton
since I kind of anticipated that you'd b e —
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1

MS. WALDRON:

Yes, (inaudible) your Honor—

2

THE COURT:

3

MR. HAMILTON:

—(inaudible) this one—
And that's—that's why I want the

4

Court to read the United States Supreme Court case dealing

5

with a similar issue, dealing with driver's licenses but a

6

different type of issue.

7

The issue in the case that's been presented which

8

is Bell vs. Berson. is whether an individual who was in an

9

accident that was uninsured is entitled to have a hearing

10

before his license is suspended.

11

have the opportunity to even have a hearing.

12

In Georgia, they didn't

It's not right on point, but it is persuasive in

13

that the court held that where there is a due process

14

violation such as this, when you take somebody's privilege or

15

right that they have, they've got an interest in this

16

driving, this driving privilege and when you take that away

17

from the driving—by the Driver's License taking it away by

18

having their agent, the officer, issue a form and violate my

19

client's, not only the statute indicating what the officer

20

must do on behalf of the Driver's License Division, but as a

21

result of that, also violating his due process rights to not

22

have these privileges taken away unilaterally without first

23

having a hearing on that.

24
25

THE COURT:

Okay.

But here's—here's the—the

central question, as near as I can tell:

11

Did the deprivation

of his—of his due process rights, in other words, the sus—
unilateral suspension in violation of the statute, compromise
the integrity of the ultimate hearing?
MR. HAMILTON:

Your Honor, we feel that—that that

is moot, that doesn't matter because it was taken away
without him ever having had the chance for the hearing.
THE COURT:

But just a second.

MR. HAMILTON:

I understand your question.

I

understand your question and I think at that point, what you
and I think—
THE COURT:

We're (inaudible) past one another,

though.
MR. HAMILTON:

No.

But I—I agree that the Court

is—what the Court sees as the issue is:

No harm, no foul

because he had the hearing and the Driver's License Division
took it away based on the hearing.

But the Driver's License

Division, through this officer, in fact, took it away before
the hearing.
THE COURT:

Okay.

Now, we're going to—we're going

to come to that piece of the puzzle, but first, it would seem
to me that you would have a stronger due process claim if
there was a connection between the absence of driving
privilege and what happened at the hearing itself.

For

example, inability to retain counsel or act—or this caused
kind of undue influence, inability to gather evidence,
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something that—that undercuts the legitimacy, the integrity
of the hearing itself.
MR. HAMILTON:

I think what the Court is saying is

if there had been some further prejudice against Mr. Miller,
that the petitioner's argument would then be strengthened.
THE COURT:

If it would have affected the—the

hearing.
Now, let me see if I can—if I can probe a little
bit what your point is. And let—first, let me see if I —
make sure I understand it, and that is, for the purposes of
argument, we'll spot you, Judge, the conclusion that the
hearing, one, occurred and was—and two, was an appropriately
conducted hearing.

But that doesn't matter because there is

an independent issue concerning the deprivation of his
driving privileges in violation of, one, the statute; two,
the Constitution.
MR. HAMILTON:
THE COURT:

That's correct.

Okay.

So, then that contention raises,

among others, the following issue:

And that is, first, what

remedy do you seek?
MR. HAMILTON:

The remedy we seek is an order

depriving the Driver's License Division the opportunity of
taking away his license based on this answer.
THE COURT:

Because?

MR. HAMILTON:

Because his due process rights were
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violated at the get-go.

Just as in a criminal case, when

your due process rights are violated, the evidence can't come
in.

And what we're asking for is, this due process right was

violated because he was never afforded notice in a hearing
before—
THE COURT:

Uh huh.

MR. HAMILTON:
THE COURT:

All right.

Mr. Ham—

—driver's license revocation.

What's the—what—what would be the

result under the following facts?

The officer gives Mr.

Miller Exhibit 1, gets back to the station, looks it over,
light goes on, Oh, my God, I've given him the wrong form,
I've checked the wrong box.

He then causes a corrected

report to go to Mr. Miller.

And for my hypothetical, let's

say that that occurs three days later.
Do you still win?

He's been deprived of his right

for three days, does that deprive the—the Driver's License
Division of proceeding with the hearing?
MR. HAMILTON:

I think it should but that's not the

facts before us and we're only here to decide what facts are
before us.
THE COURT:

I understand, but the principle is to

what degree must an individual's driving privileges be
unlawfully deprived before that deprivation eliminates the
opportunity of the Driver's License Division to revoke the
license pursuant to the statute?
14

MR. HAMILTON:

Well, I--I would put to the Court

that as soon as this individual leaves the custody of the
officer and he leaves the custody of that officer who's
acting on behalf of the Driver's License Division without a
valid driving privilege, which he entered into the custody of
that actor, that state actor with, then there's been a
violation of the statute and the statute is written to
comport with due process, Constitutional due process
requirements that if a state actor is going to take away the
right or privilege of an individual citizen, they have to do
it according to due process requirements; that is, they have
to give notice and the right to a hearing previous to the
driver's license suspension or revocation.
THE COURT:

Uh huh.

Uh huh.

Why can't I fashion

an equitable remedy which penalizes the Driver's License
Division for the, what turns out to be as a practical matter,
a premature deprivation of Mr. Miller's driving privileges by
ordering reinstatement of his driver—driving privileges 30
days in advance of when it would otherwise be available?
MR. HAMILTON:

Well, your Honor, if he was without

his driving privileges during which—during the time when he
should not have been without them, he went all the way
through, without having his driving privileges and the issue
is not trying to fashion some kind of equitable remedy that
penalizes the Driver's License Division, that's not what
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we're interested in.

What we're interested in is a remedy

that puts Mr. Miller back in the position that he would have
been, not just had the officer complied, but to show the
Driver's License Division:

You violate somebody's

Constitutional due process rights and there will be no
authority for you to take action against that person's
privilege.
And here's why, because if—and this is what the
Driver's License Division is currently doing—if this
Plaintiff's Exhibit 1 had never been served upon Mr. Miller,
that would have been a violation of the same due process
rights because he would never have had the notice of a
hearing or right to a hearing under his due process
Constitutional rights.
When that happens, the Driver's License Division
says, Well, okay, we are then precluded from taking action.
And rightfully so.

And here, we have the same type of due

process violation, taking away the privilege before hearing.
THE COURT:

Well, but in the first instance, there

is a complete deprivation of the right to notice and hearing.
The arrestee has no knowledge that the arrestee has any
opportunity to challenge the loss of license.
In—in this case, at least there is a communication
to the arrestee that the arrestee has a right to challenge
the—the suspension of the license.
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MR. HAMILTON:
hypothetical.

Then I'd like to change my

Let's assume, because the statute requires

that the individual submit the request for a hearing within
ten days of getting the ticket or the notice provided by the
Driver's License Division.

If the officer retained that

citation and notice from the Driver's License Division,
forgetting to serve it upon the individual and served him
five days later, still providing ample time for Mr. Miller to
then make his request within the ten-day period, there's
still such a violation that the Driver's License Division
would not take the driving privilege.
THE COURT:

But that goes to the point that I

raised first and that is, are we talking about a violation
that compromises the integrity of the hearing?

And I agree

with you that—that shortening the statutory notice period is
a—a substantial violation because it does precisely that.
It makes less likely the arrestee's opportunity or that he'll
exercise the opportunity to request a hearing.
ten days.

Ten days is

Ten days has been determined to be the reasonable

time to request a hearing.
And if there's a shortening of that period due to a
lapse in the—in the—in law enforcement's procedure, in my
opinion, that's something that compromises the right to a
hearing, the integrity of the hearing.
MR. HAMILTON:

This—

I feel that the Court is saying—I'm
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sorry.
THE COURT:

Oh.

MR. HAMILTON:
THE COURT:

Go ahead.

I'm done.

(Inaudible)

You said you understood it.

That's

good enough for me so I'm going t o —
MR. HAMILTON:

Okay.

I understand what the Court

is saying; however, the real issue is whether or not due
process rights of the individual have been violated.
all we need to look at.

That's

If there's been a due process

violation, then the actor, the State, or a subsidiary
thereof, is precluded from taking action.
THE COURT:

But we have examples, you know what

really comes to mind is probably the biggest example I can
think of, is Miranda, where the United States Supreme Court,
when confronted with a, what it determined to be a huge
pandemic problem involving due process, fashioned a remedy
that really wasn't—well, that included possibilities of the
death penalty in the sense of the exclusionary rule; but was
clearly attempting, in my view, to kind of fashion a remedy
consistent with the level of egregiousness of the violation
of the Constitution.
Why shouldn't I do that here?
MR. HAMILTON:

Because the United States Supreme

Court in this case, even though the facts are different and
if the Court will turn with me maybe—
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THE COURT:

Did I bring that case in with me or did

I decide I was going to take a recess and read it out there?
THE CLERK:

It should be in the file.

THE COURT:

It is. Okay.

Mr. Hamilton, where do you want me to turn?
MR. HAMILTON:
as Page 5.

Okay.

My computer printed this up

It's actually Page 539 of the opinion.

THE COURT:

Got it.

MR. HAMILTON:
sentences, it says:

At the very bottom, the last two

Suspension of issued licenses does

involve state action that adjudicates important interests of
the licensees.

And that's what we're dealing with here.

In

such cases, the licenses are not to be taken away without
that procedural due process required by the Fourteenth
Amendment.
And then in turning a couple more pages to my Page
7, Page 542 under the U.S. Reporter.

Towards the bottom of

that paragraph that indi—that starts with Key Note 7 or Head
Note 7.
THE COURT:

Got it.

MR. HAMILTON:

Right where Foot Note 5 begins, in

the—in the—in the paragraph.

Due process requires that

when a state seeks to terminate an interest such as that
herein involved, and that was the driving privilege, it must
afford notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the
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nature of the case before the termination becomes effective.
Here, he was given notice and right to a hearing,
but that suspension or revocation became effective before he
was provided the opportunity for the hearing.
backwards.

They got it

And that's what happened here, they got it

backwards, they took away the privilege, then gave the
hearing.
And the U.S. Supreme Court says no, such a
privilege as this, someone's driving privilege, if you're
going to take that away, State, first give them the hearing,
then you can take it away.

Not the other way around.

And so we're saying that based on this case and Mr.
Miller's due process rights that were here violated and I
think that's pretty apparent, and there was a violation of
the statute as well and the statute was drafted to afford due
process rights under the Constitution.

That's the reason it

was drafted the way it was so that there would not be a
suspension prior to the hearing.
And in fact, Driver's License Division, if you want
an extension of time for the hearing, if you want to continue
it because your attorney or yourself is—has a conflict with
that day, in order for you to get that extension, you have to
waive your right in writing to have the hearing after they
suspend.

So, they'll take your license at the end of the 30

days, if the hearing has been scheduled after the 30 days and
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in order for them to even consider continuing it after that
30-day period, when this Exhibit 1 is valid as a driver's
license, you've got to waive that privilege in writing.
And so even though the Driver's License Division in
other instances is trying to comport with the statute and the
requirements of due process, in this case, they didn't try to
do that.

Thereafter, the officer took away my client's due

process rights by suspending or revoking his privileges
before the hearing.

And that's all it comes down to.

Was there a violation of due process right?

If

there was, then there can be no action by the Driver's
License Division.
THE COURT:

Uh huh.

Well, Ms. Waldron, first, do

you concede that—that there was an erroneous failure to
provide Mr. Miller with a temporary license?
MS. WALDRON:

I do concede that.

He should have

been granted the—the temporary license (inaudible) yes.
THE COURT:

Okay.

MS. WALDRON:

Now, what to do?

Well, you know, in—in cases where

the issue of civil rights is addressed or deprivation of
property rights, whether it's—and I don't have any cases to
cite, but when there's a post-deprivation hearing, when a
person is granted a hearing after the right has been—an
individual has been deprived of that right, there has been
case law which has said that that is sufficient.

21

And whether—I know there's some with regard to
inmates, when they've been deprived of property or whatever,
and then after the fact, they've been given a postdeprivation hearing.

I believe that the courts have said

that that's sufficient to cure the lack of a hearing prior to
the deprivation.
And as our argument here is because there was a
hearing after the fact, there was technically a postdeprivation hearing, even though that hearing dealt with—
with respect to the Driver's License Division, the initial
revocation, there was evidence presented, the hearing officer
heard everything and at that time, determined that his
license should be revoked.
THE COURT:

Okay.

I'm spotting you the—that there

was an appropriately conducted hearing; but we've still got
an individual who was deprived of a privilege, a stategranted privilege of considerable importance and
significance.

No one—no one is going to seriously debate

the importance of driving privileges; after all, that's why
the deprivation of that for driving while intoxicated is a
serious piece of business.

Not only does it protect the

citizens from impaired drivers on the road but the driving
privilege is something of considerable value to all of us.
And so what we've got is Mr. Miller, who has been
wrongfully deprived of something that is important for 30
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days.
And so, really, what we're talking about here i s , —
is one, does it matter?

And I—I hear you telling me, well,

Judge, it doesn't matter, which isn't—that's a loser. I
mean, I —
MS. WALDRON:
matter.

Well, no, it's not that it doesn't

It's just that if there was no hearing at all, I

think we'd be in real trouble; but the fact that there was a
post-deprivation hearing, so there was a hearing, and—at
which time his license was revoked, I think we're looking at
the remedy.

I mean, there was that 30 days—

THE COURT:

We are—exactly—

MS. WALDRON:
THE COURT:

—we're looking at the remedy here.

And so I'm—I'm inviting—

MS. WALDRON:
THE COURT:

And—
—you to suggest a remedy for—

MS. WALDRON:
THE COURT:

Well—
—me.

MS. WALDRON:

— I think the most logical remedy

from the respondent's point of view is, to whatever days his
license was suspended prior to the initial hearing be
deducted from the year.

So, it would be a total of a year

from the ini—would be from the date of arrest.
THE COURT:
MS. WALDRON:

From the date of arrest rather than—
From the date of the arrest for a
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year.

And that would be the—the respondent's feeling of

appropriate remedy, whereas, because it was—if you look at
the case law and I think the post-deprivation hearing cures
any due process violation, but you have the—you have to look
at that 30 days and factor that in to whatever the revocation
is.
MR. HAMILTON:
THE COURT:

May I respond, your Honor?

Yeah.

MR. HAMILTON:

Please do.

On—on the bottom of that Page 5

that I referred to, referred you to earlier, just as this
Court has indicated, it's an important interest, this driving
privilege.

And as it says, suspension of issued licenses

thus involves state action and adjudicates important
interests of the licensees.
And it goes on to say, In such cases—and that is
the suspension of an individual's license—the licensee's
are—the licenses are not to be taken away without that
procedural due process required by the Fourteenth Amendment.
Here, there was a violation of the procedural due process
under the Fourteenth Amendment, it was violated and
therefore, this individual's license is not to be taken away.
THE COURT:

Uh huh.

MR. HAMILTON:
away.

His privilege is not to be taken

I don't know what cases Counsel's talking about of

post-deprivation, a post-deprivation hearing.
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Clearly,

they're not dealing with driver's license which the U.S.
Supreme Court has already said, hey, this is an important
interest, this driving privilege.

If you're going to take

that away, you can't take it away unless you comply with the
Fourteenth Amendment due process requirements.
And here, the State has already admitted that they
did not comply with that; therefore, they are precluded o r —
or this Court is precluded to—from fashioning some other
remedy, other than outright granting of the petitioner's
petition.
THE COURT:

Is there any indication that—that this

event was anything other than a (sic) isolated oversight on
the part of one officer?
MR. HAMILTON:

I have seen it happen on one other

occasion and my client on that occasion did not wish to
appeal; but I think the Driver's License Division needs to be
aware that this is the same type of due process violation as
is service of process.

It's the same type, so that they're

not—so that when these isolated instances, when officers are
less than adequately trained, when they do this, the Driver's
License Division should be notified to that.
doesn't get his license taken away.

This one person

If you comply with the

procedural due process requirements, yeah, then yeah, at a
hearing, you can take it away; but if you don't, you don't
get to.
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It's not happening very often.

I do a lot of DUIs

as this Court's probably already aware and I see one every
two years, maybe.
THE COURT:

Okay.

MS. WALDRON:
THE COURT:

Your Honor?

Ms. Waldron?

MS. WALDRON:

Just one brief thing.

With respect

to this case, Bell vs. Berson. it's my understanding—and I
haven't read the whole thing, that no hearing was afforded at
all in this case.
THE COURT:

Correct.

MS. WALDRON:
THE COURT:

Is that correct?

That's right.

MR. HAMILTON:
MS. WALDRON:
distinguishing factor.

That is right.
And I think that is a really big
You know, if no hearing was afforded,

yeah, I think it would be a due process problem; but we did
afford a hearing, and so that would distinguish our case
extremely from Bell vs. Berson.
THE COURT:

Okay.

MR. HAMILTON:

Except that referring to the latter

part that I cited to earlier, Notice and opportunity for
hearing appropriate to the nature of the case before the
termination becomes effective.

This termination of driving

privileges became effective before the hearing.
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And so the

language in the case is sufficient to say, this is an
important enough privilege or right that we're not going to
let you take away their license if you try to take it away
before the hearing.
THE COURT:

It's an interesting problem and one

which, in my view, merits the following result:
First of all, I find that there has been a—a
deprivation of Mr. Miller's statutory right and his right to
due process by reason of the failure to provide Mr. Miller
with a temporary license, as mandated under the statute.
I next find that Mr. Miller was advised of his
right to a hearing to challenge the propriety of the
deprivation of his driving privileges, that he exercised that
right, that his driving privileges were in fact revoked for a
period of one year pursuant to a hearing, and that the
integrity of the hearing wasn't compromised by reason of the
unlawful suspension of his driving privileges for the period
of time between arrest and the hearing.
Next, it's rele—it's relevant, in my view, that
the nature of the deprivation here is not a systemic problem
in law enforcement or within the Driver's License Division
but is one which occurs from time to time.

As law

enforcement officers share with judges the—the flaw of being
fallible from time to time, probably law enforcement less
than judges.

27

My task is to fashion an appropriate remedy and I —
in my view, I have considerable discretion in fashioning a
remedy to a due process violation.
Mr. Hamilton has drawn my attention to the case of
Bell vs. Berson and I commend Mr. Hamilton for his typically
thorough research into these—into these matters.

The Bell

vs. Berson case has been argued for two principles. Mr.
Hamilton argues the language in the lead opinion, might even
be the unanimous opinion, for the proposition that there must
be notice and hearing before there can be a deprivation of a
property interest or any other Constitutionally protected
interest.
Ms. Waldron urges that I bear in mind that there
are important distinguishing characteristics between Bell vs.
Berson, to-wit that the driving force in Bell vs. Berson was
that there was no provision for any notice of hearing in
Georgia prior to the deprivation of driving privileges for
failure to provide evidence of insurance.
I think the—that Ms. Waldron's analysis of—of
what's going on in Bell vs. Berson is more relevant to—to
this setting and that the precise question presented in this
case, and that is, in a case where there is—there has been
notice and hearing but there has also been a pre-notice and
hearing deprivation or pre-hearing deprivation of rights,
does that deprive the governmental entity of any further
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authority—authority to effect a deprivation?
The answer to that, without the presence of a
systemic problem, is no.

The State may properly proceed with

the process which might result in further deprivation of—of-of rights or interests subject to the fashioning of a
remedy, which I'm about to fashion.
I conclude that, one, the administrative revocation
was appropriate.
Two, that it is appropriate, given the facts and
circumstances in this case, to reinstate Mr. Miller's license
60 days earlier than it otherwise would have been reinstated.
That conclusion is based on my evaluation, based on
a totality of the circumstances of the egregiousness of the
deprivation.
MR. HAMILTON:

May I just make a record briefly,

your Honor?
THE COURT:

Please do.

MR. HAMILTON:

Due process rights inherently

individual as opposed to the community and it's our position
that the Court holding that it is not a systemic problem is
irrelevant to the determination as to whether this
individual's due process rights have been violated, because
they're individual rights.
THE COURT:

Yeah, I understand.

MR. HAMILTON:

And so we would ask the Court at
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this point to modify its holding and make it appropriate for
trie individual as opposed to the community, because that's
not why we're here.
THE COURT:

Yeah.

Although not articulated, I—I

had taken actually what you said into account and I'm going
to stand by what I did.
MR. HAMILTON:
THE COURT:

Thank you, your Honor.

And thank you, folks.

It's always a

pleasure to see you.
MS. WALDRON:

Your Honor, would you like me to

prepare the appropriate order and—and—
THE COURT:

That—that would be great.

MS. WALDRON:
THE COURT:

—show it to counsel?
Since, for the most part, you've been

able to just kind of sit here and observe this morning.
We'll give you something substantive to do.
MR. HAMILTON:

Your Honor, could we ask for a—an

order staying—
THE COURT:

So you can appeal?

MR. HAMILTON:
THE COURT:

— s o we can appeal?

Have you got a problem with that?

MR. HAMILTON:

I think it's an interesting enough

issue that—
THE COURT:

Yeah, I think it's a fascinating issue,

MS. WALDRON:

I think it's a fascinating issue.
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I'll agree.
THE COURT:

Yeah.

MR. HAMILTON:
THE COURT:

And I'll grant it.

Thank you, your Honor.

So, when—

MR. HAMILTON:

If there is an order in place right

now—
THE COURT:

Let me just tell you what that's done.

That's shifted to you and away from Ms. Waldron the
responsibility for drawing the papers.
MR. HAMILTON:

I'll draw them up and have them

approved as to form by Ms. Waldron and submit them to the
Court for signature.
THE COURT:

And I look forward to the result. And

you know, because it's going to be appealed, spend some time,
you may want to get the videotape, writing down in, I don't
know, as comprehensive a form as you think is appropriate,
the rationale for what I did.

I appreciate that, in fact,

can we give Mr. Hamilton a tape?

We're going to give you the

tape.
MR. HAMILTON:
THE COURT:

On behalf of Mr. Miller, thank you.

No problem.

(Whereupon, this hearing was concluded.)

* * *
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